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I- INTRODUCTION
The Combat Active Replacement Factor (CARF) is a key
logistics planning factor used in preparing budget submis-
sions concerning Prepositioned War Reserve Stocks (PWRS)
.
The manner in which this factor is currently generated is a
matter of concern to Marine Corps logistics planners. Since
the CARF is primarily an esti irate of equipment losses in
future conflicts, it is important to the Marine Corps that
the basic methodology of CARF generation is based on sound
reasoning. The current method of generation (which is
explained in the following chapter) , along with the subjec-
tive evaluation of some existing CARF values, often create
doubt as to the accuracy of the factors produced.
This thesis will review the methods currently used for
CARF generation and will suggest criteria by which several
current combat models will be judged as to their ability to
produce reasonable CARF estimates. Before proceeding with
an explanation of the current system, we will examine the
definition and usage of CARFs.
A. THE DEFINITION OF A REPLACEHENT FACTOR
The formal definition of a replacement factor is
twofold. The first portion is stipulated by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and is therefore uniformly applicable
throughout DOD. The second portion is added to the JCS
definition by the Marine Corps [Ref. 1 ]. The definition
reads as follows:
1. Replacement Factors. A replacement factor is
defined as: "the estimated percentage of equipment in
use that will require replacement during a given period
due to wear-out beyond repair, enemy action. abandon-
ment, pilferage, and other causes, except catastrophes"
(JCS Pub.1). The Marine Ccrps expresses replacement
factors as quantities required for a 30-day period.
Replacement factors are identified in the item data file
(IDF) and the Table of Authorized Material (TAM) .
We note from the definition that the Marine Corps, not
JCS, stipulated that replacement factors apply to quantities
required for a 30-day period. Other services may choose a
different time span as a basis for implementation of
replacement factors. It should be noted that the replace-
ment factor is a percentage by definition. Current Marine
Corps practice expresses all replacement factors as four
decimal place ratios (in the TAM and IDF) rather than
percentages [Eef. 2]. We also observe the estimate of
equipment requiring replacement applies to the " equipment in
use". This implies that there may be equipment not being
used such as items being held in reserve by a field
commander or items held in invextory at a supply facility.
B. THE DEFINITION OF A COMBAT ACTIVE REPLACEMENT FACTOR
(CARF)
The CARF is one of three different types of replacement
factors used in the Marine Ccrps [Ref. 1 ]. A CARF is
defined as follows:
1. Combat Active (CA) . The combat active replace-
ment factor will be applied for units during those
periods when they are actually in active combat opera-
tions. A force in contact with the enemy is considered
to be active combat. The combat active replacement
factor reflects anticipated combat attrition of equip-
ment, on a 30-day basis, incident to amphibious opera-
tions and other combat operations normal to the FMF.
When applied to the density of equipment. the combat
active replacement factor determines the amount of
combat attrition, based on anticipated intensity of
combat by geographic areas. The Commandant of the
ilarine Corps (Code I) establishes the period of support
planned for each force and the applicable factors to be
used in determination of requirements.
(a) Europe Intense (EI). This factor will be
applied to determine the requirements for the forces
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comraited in the European Theater and will be restricted
to the period of support during which intense combat is
anticipated.
(b) Europe Sustained (ES) . This factor will be
applied to determine the requirements for the remaining
Period of support planned for forces committed in the
uropean Theater.
(c) Worldwide Intense (WI) . This factor will be
applied to determine the requirements for forces
committed to any geographic area other than Europe and
will be restricted to the period of support during which
intense combat is anticipated.
(d) Worldwide Sustained (WS) . This factor will
be applied to determine the requirements for the
remaining period of support planned for forces committed
to any geographic area other than Europe.
Before proceeding, four facts should be emphasized.
First, the CAEF is obviously a scenario dependent factor.
Attrition of equipment will depend on both friendly and
enemy force size, composition, disposition, training,
tactics and lines of communication in a particular combat
situation. This indicates that scenario holds a key role in
CARF generation. Secondly, we note that the "equipment in
use" will be considered for replacement within a replacement
factor. The CARF restricts this by considering only the
equipment of units which are in "contact with the enemy".
The CARF also stipulates that attrition of equipment be
restored to full Table of Equipment (T/E) allowance.
Thirdly, due to the mission of the Marine Corps, both
"amphibious and other combat operations" are to be included
in the CARF. Lastly, four types of CARFs are defined by the
Marine Corps: European and Worldwide scenarios, each with
intense and sustained activity levels.
The Marine Corps currently publishes CARF values for
most combat essential (type 1) items in classes II (indi-
vidual and organizational equipment) and VII (major end
items) . CARF values are also published for items needed in
special situations (type 2 and 3 items) which consist of
construction materials, cold weataer equipment and clothing,
or other situational items (class II, IV and VII)
1 1
[Refs. 1,2]. Accordingly, CAEFs are published for a large
number of items which span the spectrum of equipment types
used within the Marine Corps. It would be difficult, within
one combat model, to generate CARF values for all these
items. For many of these items, CARF values may be gener-
ated in a manner indirectly related to the combat model.
Historical, exercise, or usage data may be possible sources
for generating CARF values for items not considered by the
combat model.
C. THE CURRENT APPLICATION OF CARFS
The current use of CARF values bears important budgetary
implications in two of its current roles. The first role is
the direct use of CARF values in computation of budget
dollars required for purchase cf Prepositioned War Reserve
Stocks (PWR5) . This key role of the CARF insures its effect
on the m u It i- million dollar portion of the yearly Marine
Corps budget which is devoted to the procurement of PERS.
Its second major role is as a key factor in the Marine Air
Ground Task Force (MAGTF) lift model. This model is used in
logistical planning for Marine Corps and joint service oper-
ations. This model also influences shipping requirements
being planned for Marine Corps involvement in national
contingency plans. These two roles are of such importance
that the accuracy of CARF values currently generated should
be examined. Other uses of the CARF exist at Headquarters
Marine Corps, Marine logistics crganiza tions, and throughout
the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) . Table 1 lists several current
uses of CARF values in the Marire Corps.
D. THE PURPOSE OF THIS STDDY
The primary purpose of this study is the evaluation of
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their aptitude for generating CARF values. Prior to under-
taking such an evaluation, two tasks will be performed.
First, the history and current methodology of CARF genera-
tion will be described. Discussion of current and previous
methods will lead to a list of strengths and weaknesses of
the current system. With this list as a basis, we will
proceed to the second task which is the development of
criteria by which a CARF generation system (i.e. a combat
model) should be evaluated. In order to arrive at suitable
criteria, we need to keep in mind the purposes which require
the use of a CARF, the range cf items for which a CARF is
computed, and the types of combat scenarios which will
require CARF generation.
From the criteria derived above, a scoreboard can be
constructed by which a combat mcdel may be evaluated for the
specific purposes of examining its applicability to CARF
generation.
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II. THE CARF GENERATION SYSTEM TODAY
The previous and current CAEF generation systems will be
described in this chapter in order to provide a brief
history of CARF generation and to identify several problems
which existed in the previous system or currently exist in
today's process.
A. THE PREVIOUS HETHCD OF CARF GENERATION
Prior to July of 1981, the commodity branches within the
Materiel Division of the Installations and Logistics branch
of HQMC were responsible for the origination of CARF values
for new items entering the inventory. The individual
Acquisition Project Officers (APO) generally bore this
responsibility. The APOs were to consider such factors as
engineering estimates, test results, research studies, CARFs
for like items, factors assigned by other branches of DOD
and their own "military judgment". The APO was also respon-
sible for initiating changes to existing CARF values. The
APO submitted his proposals to the Replacement Factor Review
Board.
The Review Board was responsible for approval of CARF
values for new items as well as the revision of established
CARF values as they deemed necessary. The Board's primary
tools were the collective judgment and experience of its
members. The Review Board's results were forwarded to the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Installation and Logistics for
action. Approved CARFs were recorded in the Item Data File
(IDF) and periodically published in the Table of Authorized















Figure 2.1 Overview of the Previous CAEF Generation System
B. THE CURRENT CARF GENERATION SYSTEM
Currently, the primary methodology of CARF generation is
the utilization of U.S. Army Wartime Active Replacement
Factors (WARFs) . This methodology was implemented sutseguent
to a study completed by SRI International (SRI) [Ref. 4].
SRI divided the Marine Corps definition of a CARF into two
segments: the Combat Active Attrition Rate (CAAR) and the
Combat Active Replacement Factor (CARF) [Ref. 4: p. 2]- The
CAAR is defined as follows:
17
Combat Active Attrition Bate (CAAR)*— The estimated
percentage of the in-use amount of an item that is
expected to be lost during a given 30-day period of
active combat as the result of combat attrition.
According to the SRI report, the only difference between
a CARF and a CAAR is that a CARF has been reviewed and
approved for publication. In the report, the CARF is
defined as follows:
Combat Active Replacement Factor (CARF) *— An approved
planning factor used principally for material require-
ments determination which states the percentage of tiie
in-use amount of an item that is expected to require
replacement during a given 30-day period of active
combat as the result of combat attrition.
There are two subtle differences between the Marine
Corps and SRI definitions. First the SRI definition doesn't
require replacement of equipment to the T/E allowance level.
Secondly, the CARF defined by SRI was intended to allow
adjustments to the CAAR for several reasons, as noted in
this excerpt [Ref. 4: p-2].
The CAAR serves as an estimate of combat losses while
the CARF represents the rate at which the Marine Corps
will plan (i.e., compute requirements) to actually
replace combat losses. This distinction recognizes the
possibility that shipping constraints, budget
constraints, and other considerations may preclude the
use of CARFs that would call for the replacement of all
equipment losses.
The definition of a CAAR acd CARF offered by SRI have
not been adopted by the Marine Corps for general use. The
CARF generation system proposed by SRI was adopted [Ref. 5]
and is described briefly in Appendix A.
He should also note that the user's manual for the
current Marine Corps CARF Determination System [Bef. 6]
states that only two types of CARF are used within the




are the Sustained and Intense Replacement Factors. In a
headquarters order [ Ref - 7] on guidelines for a Replacement
Factor Review Board, the Marine Corps appears to endorse
this modified definition of the number of types of CARF
values. This has not yet been reflected in any orders
except Reference 7; accordingly, this policy is not yet
widely used in the Marine Corps.
C. OBSERVATIONS REGARDING THE CURRENT SYSTEM
Adoption of SRI's CARF determination system created a
minor conflict in the definition of a CARF. The current
official definition indicates that CARF determines the
amount of equipment to be replaced each (30-day) month to
maintain full T/E allowance. SRI dropped this requirement
from its CARF definition. It appears that SRI's CAAR defi-
nition is similar to the official definition; however, the
CAAR speaks of attrition only, rot replacement to any level.
The SRI report further states that the CARF should represent
the rate at which the Marine Corps will actually replace
combat losses [Ref. 4: p. 2 ]- This CARF will take into
account shipping and budgetary constraints. The obvious
guestion is how one could derive such shipping and budgetary
constraints to be applied to a long-range logistics planning
factor, since such constraints usually arise on short
notice. Such constraints are not consistent with the JCS
definition of replacement factors which consider only attri-
tion due to the effects of the tattle area. We can see that
consideration of shipping capacity and budgetary constraints
(other than attrition of shipping) is not pertinent to CARF
generation. The reader should also be aware that the CARF
values originally derived by the SRI process in 1981, were a
result of the P-86 WARF study (completed in 1931). These
CARF values have not significantly changed sinca then, with
the exception of new items of eguipment.
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As a final observation, we need to ask how CARF "values
for items which have no Army counterpart (and thus no WARF)
are generated. There are several items in the Marine Corps
inventory for which this does occur. When there are no Army
items which are similar, CARF values are generated fcr these
items in a manner similar to the previous CARF generation
system (subjectively using military judgement) . If there is
a group of Army items (equipment) similar in nature (but not
exactly the same) , WARF values from the class of items in
which it belongs are averaged and then applied as a CARF
value to the mismatched Marine Corps item [Rex. 6]- This is
another potential source of iraccuracy in the CARF since
several items have no direct WAEF value basis.
D. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO ADOPTION OF THE WABF AS THE
BASIS FOR CARF GENERATION
The SRI study of September 198 1 recognized four sound
reasons for adopting the Army methodology as basis for a
CARF determination process. These four reasons should be
considered prior to adopting a new system in the future.
First, the cost of implementing the system would be guite
low since it would only involve the use of the previously
derived Army WARF. The Marine Corps could access the WARF
data at no additional cost except the software to run the
system. Secondly, the methodology has already been devel-
oped by the Army; hence, no extra time or money would be
spent trying to adopt another model (or develop a new model)
to perform this function. Thirdly, it took little or no
additional personnel to use the system as adopted by SRI
since the actual derivation was completed by the Army,
lastly, the new system was cocsidered to be more objective
than the previous subjective system.
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In order to understand mere thoroughly any problems
which exist with the current CARF generation system, we
should understand how the WARF (the basis of the CAEF) is
developed. A brief description of the methodology used to
derive the WARF is given in Appendix B [ Ref . 3: p. 25]-
Readers unfamiliar with the "WARF may desire to refer to
Appendix B before proceeding.
E. SOME HAZARDS OF flARINE CORPS RELIANCE ON WARFS
Several problems occur from adopting the WARF as a basis
foe a CARF. Host of these problems arise due to the absence
of Marine Corps input to the cata base used in generating
the WARF. We will start with a list of deficiencies of the
WARF generation process as identified in a 1980 study. (1)
The unit effectiveness is not degraded realistically when
suffering high loss rates. (2) The Forward Edge of the
Battle Area (FEBA) orientation may not represent the modern
battlefield. (3) An inability to model fast tactical
maneuver and complete breakthrough is probably due to the
12-hour time step used in Concepts Evaluation Model (CEM)
.
(4) Pace and intensity of combat within the model is not
responsive to new continuous warfare concepts. (5) Command,
Control, Communication, and Intelligence (C3I) are not
addressed adequately. [Ref„ 3]
In addition to these shortcomings, the Combat Sample
Generator (COSAGE) Model exhibits a distinct problem.
COSAGE is a 24-hour division sized picture which is then
taken by the Concepts Evaluation Model (CEM) and extrapo-
lated to a 180-day theater level conflict. The problem here
is obviously a large extrapolation of COSAGE data prone to
distort the final WARF values in an unknown direction;
therefore, the WARF accuracy is questionable.
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Input of Marine Corps historical data is also a problem.
The Army inputs its own historical data (along with exer-
cises, tests etc.) into WARRAMPS. The Marine Corps may only
input its data during the CARF determination process. The
portion of the WARF which is the result of such Army data is
indistinguishable at this point; accordingly, we cannot
remove that portion of a WARF in order to add the effect of
Marine Corps peculiar data. This means that Army historical
data is intrinsically part of the CARF. This may be either
good or bad, but the point remains we are uncertain what the
effect is on the final CARF.
The CEM is deterministic in nature, and COSAGE is a
Monte Carlo simulation. There are inherent problems with
Monte Carlo simulations such as cost and time to run a
model, since a great many replications must be used to
attain an acceptable level of accuracy. Deterministic algo-
rithms tend to be much less conputer intensive than a Monte
Carlo simulation.
A crucial problem to the Marine Corps is the unavoidable
fact that WARRAMPS uses data prepared by Army personnel
using Army scenarios in which representative Army weapons
mixes and Army tactical doctrine are used. The Marine Corps
would not normally expect to fight with Army tactical
doctrine in an Army scenario with the same weapons mix the
Army uses. Thus, in adopting the WARF, the Marine Corps is
using a value which is not representative of its own
doctrine. The current system lacks an amphibious phase;
therefore, it is impossible for the Marine Corps to use a
CARF for such an eventuality.
The size of the WAERAMP system is very large. This
model has the ability to track, several Army Corps in a large
theater, probably Europe, for several months. The Marine
Corps generally isn't concerned with such a large problem.
A smaller model could easily produce more accurate results
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for a probable Marine Corps • scenario (such as the northern
flank of NATO). (A smaller mcdel would have the advantage
of using less computer resources and could possibly be a
Marine Corps in-house model.) The Marine Corps simply
suffers from the size of WARRAMPS. Each Army study (which
produces new WARFs) takes a full year to complete; thus,
this model is not responsive tc short term needs such as a
change in scenario or a possible short term conflict.
Dp to this point, we have discussed what a CARF is and
how it is currently generated. Me have also observed the
process for the derivation of the foundation of the CARF,
and the Army WAEF. Weaknesses, along with strengths of the
current CARF and flARF generation systems have been noted.
In the following chapters, we will combine these points with
other criteria to form a checklist of items which would be
used to rate any system as to its ability to generate accu-
rate CARF values.
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III. CBITEHIA FOR CARF GENERATION
As we have seen, a CARF value is highly scenario depen-
dent. Factors which influence the scenario , such as
friendly (and enemy) force size, disposition, weapons mix
and mode of operation (amphibious, offensive, defensive,
etc.)/ all have a direct effect on a CARF value. In order
to generate a CARF, we would like to analyze the factors
that effect a CARF, within the scenario. Analysis of these
factors will yield essential elements which might be consid-
ered in evaluating a CARF generation system. The elements,
or criteria, fall into two categories: first, those criteria
suggested by the definition of a CARF; and second, criteria
suggested by practical constraints within the Marine Corps.
A. CRITEBIA DERIVED FROM THE CflRF DEFINITION
The definition of a CARF can be expressed in a brief
mathematical model as follows:
CARI
;
= (£ QE;; /N2)100. (3.1)
The variable QE-- is the quantity of equipment of type i
which has been attrited by cause j over a thirty day period.
The variable NEj is the number of eguipment type i in the
area. Finally, i represents Marine Corps equipment while j
represents the cause of equipment loss.
Before we analyze QEj: and NEj further, we stop to
remember that we should view these variables with regard to
the manner in which the CARF will be used. Since the CARF
is used primarily for PWRS budget planning and amphibious
lift capacity plans, the variables QE-'j and NEj should be
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computed in a manner which will give an accurate CARF for
these twc purposes. To accomplish this, we can view the
definitions of a replacement factor and a CARF in a somewhat
broader sense. For example, a "force in contact with the
enemy" should be any force which could be attrited due to
enemy action. This would include transport convoys bound
for the theater which are susceptible to the enemy air and
submarine attack. The only causes of attrition not consid-
ered (by definition) would be catastrophic losses such as
tidal waves, earthquakes, tornados, hurricanes, and similar
events.
Considering this broad interpretation, the quantity of
equipment attrited, QE-.j , can he subdivided into three main
categories: loss in hands of ccmbat units, loss of material
in storage or maintenance (in theater) and loss of material
in transit to the combat theater. Within each category of
loss, causes of individual item losses may be assigned.
Table 2 lists many such causes, although this list could
easily be modified to fit a particular scenario [fief. 8].
When we consider the broad interpretation of a "...force
in contact-... 11 , the number of equipment type i, NEj, seems
an easy quantity to compute. The reference level used to
compute NE ; is the Table of Equipment allowance of equipment
type i as given in the definition of a CARF. For combat
units, this is a relatively easy determination; however, for
storage facilities in theater, or for equipment in transit,
this is not trivial. These twc categories must be assigned
a reference level (like a T/S allowance) for the determina-
tion of NEj. This could be done within a CARF determination
system by assigning levels or by simulating quantities of
equipment in storage or transit. These levels must be real-
istic to prevent inflation or deflation of NEj ; hence, the
inverse effect on the CARF. Fcr example, if we supposed QE
= 60 for a thirty day period (e.g., 60 jeeps lost) , and we
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determined a T/E level of 45 jeeps for combat units and 5
jeeps for theater storage and in transit, then the CARF=12Q£
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( (60/ (45 + 5) ) 100) . If we had included another 100 jeeps
which were shipped on the 25th day of the period instead of
the 5 jeeps for theater storage and in transit, we would
have a CARF=40 ro, resulting in a deflated CARF value.
B. CRITERIA GENERATED FROM PRACTICAL CONSTRAINTS
Due to the size and mission of the Marine Corps, several
practical constraints on any CABF generation system need to
be recognized. First of all, the Marine Corps cannot easily
spare personnel to operate such a system. Any new system
needs to be as streamlined and compact as possible to mini-
mize the number of personnel required for operation.
Secondly, the data for such a system should come primarily
from existing sources, such as data generated and maintained
by CNA or the Army. This will aid in reducing the system
manpower requirement. Thirdly, any Marine Corps sponsored
CARF generation system should be compatible with the
computer assets at Quantico or the Installations and
Logistics section of HQMC.
These three practical restraints can be met by speci-
fying three characteristics which contribute to reduction of
system size. First, associating the loss of a majcr end
item to the loss of its components or physically related
items enable us to reduce the data base size. For example,
if we designate personal equipment (rifles, 782 gear,
clothing, etc.) as a component of the individual Marine,
loss of one Marine will indicate loss of his personal equip-
ment. Similarly, loss of a tank will indicate the loss of
all components (such as its .5C-caliber machine-gun) which
belong to the tank. Secondly, analysis of the types of
items requiring a CARF should reduce the number of items in
the actual data base for the CARF generation system.
Association of losses, and consideration of only high dollar
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value items (which are important to budget planning or
amphibious lift planning) will enable us to restrict the
number of items considered. The fewer items considered, the
small€r the overall system and fewer operators needed.
Lastly, the scenarios for which a CARF is to be computed
should be restricted to that scenario which is considered to
be "worst-case" for the Marine Corps. Since the CABF is
used in budget planning, we need to consider the "worst
case" scenario in a strategic (area of the world in which
the conflict may occur) vice a tactical (within the theater
of operations) connotation. If a set of CARF values is
prepared for this scenario, the budget planning which
results from these CARF values would be ample for any other
world crisis if indeed the "worst-case" scenario was
correct. Using the CARF for more routine purposes in the
FMF could be supplemented or replaced by usage data or exer-
cise history data, thereby reducing the need for CARF values
for lesser scenarios (i.e., a wcrldwide CARF value). These
three characteristics will be helpful in keeping the size of
any CARF generation system small enough to be used by the
Marine Corps on an in-house basis.
We have identified several problems with the current
system in the previous chapter and have discussed several
criteria to be applied to any future CARF generation system
in this chapter. The following chapter will consider the
characteristics of combat models which will be most helpful
in evaluating current models for CARF generation.
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IV. MODEL ATTRIBUTES D ESI BED FOR CARF GENERATION
This chapter will concentrate on explaining several
attributes which we desire tc see in a model used to
generate CARF values. We will initially investigate several
general qualities which are intrinsic in a fundamentally
sound combat model. Highlights of modeling technologies
will be discussed to assess their effect on the attributes
and qualities desired in a combat model. The later portion
of the chapter will be dedicated to deriving a Measure of
Effectiveness (MOE) which will be useful in comparing
existing combat models. We will use the attributes and MOE
in Chapter V to survey several different combat models.
A. ATTRIBUTES DESIRED IN A COMEAT MODEL
Combat modeling is not precise by nature. The assump-
tions involved and the volatile, unpredictable nature of
combat indictate that combat models will not be a precise
(precise in the sense an accounting model is precise in
predicting future monetary outcomes) prediction of future
conflict. This lack of a precise mathematical representa-
tion of combat has led to a colorful name for this issue:
the "Sguishy Problem" [Refs. 9,10]. In a report to
Congress, the General Accounting Office (5A0) has outlined
several attributes which are desirable of any computer model
used for contributing to the budget process [Ref. 10: p. 3].
These attributes assist the decision maker in determining
how useful the information from a "policy assisting model"
is for his purpose. Such attritutes are somewhat subjective
in nature; however, they are useful to us as criteria by
which we can evaluate combat models for the purpose of CARF
generation. The attributes are as follows:
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Our purpose is... to emphasize the need for ensuring that
policy assisting models used in Defense Decision are:
* Transparent so that a decisionmaker can understand and
use~T"he model as an extension of his/her own judgment.
Implying that
—Assumptions are clearly described and held to
manageable proportions^ and
—The deductive process leading to the model's
assertions is clear (transparent)
.
* Apprai sed so that a decisionmaker can be assured that
—The model is mathematically correct,
—
'The part of the model that is science matches the
real world , and
--The model uses empirically valid data.
* Consistent so that communication is facilitated
throug"Eou£"~trh*e decisionmaking hierarchy. Implying that
—Problems are analyzed in the same context, and
--Differing viewpoints can he discussed on the
basis of speciric assumptions.
Since the computation of CABF values are based on attri-
tion of equipment, we need to understand the two basic
approaches to attrition modeling: aggregated and detailed.
The aggregated method commonly uses firepower scores to
determine an overall index for a unit's strength. The ratio
of the indices for a red and a blue force is called the
force ratio. This "lumps together" into one number the
strength of several weapons which is then used to determine
the number of units attrited in an enemy force. An example
of this process using tanks is shown in Figure 4.1 [Ref. 10:
p. 55]. The problem with aggregation is the decision to
disaggregate the firepower index after attrition into its
separate components. This is not a very "transparent" or
mathematically sound concept. GAO states [Ref. 10: p. 54]
the problem with aggregation as follows:
Firepower scores are commonly used as a basis for aggre-
gation. The basic problem in developing an aggregation
scheme is a linear weighting problem (e.g., how many
rifles are equivalent to a tank, a flamethrower, or an
aircraft?). Further, the linear addition of firepower
scores does not reflect the generally accepted principle
that the whole of a force is worth more tnan the sum "of
its parts—e.g.. two tanks operating in unison should be
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Figure 4. 1 The Problea Posed by Aggregation
31
Detailed models for attrition tend to predict killer-
victim relationships based on weapon performance factors,
acquisition parameters, line of flight data, number of
weapons by type and data on force employment. These factors
may involve subjective input, but the relationship which
links these inputs to the attrition of a particular weapon
is usually more transparent and consistent than the aggre-
gated model. A detailed model of attrition considers the
loss of individual weapons. An aggregated model of attri-
tion considers the sum of the losses from a group of similar
weapons (as done in using a firepower index) . GAO stated
the difference between the two model types as follows:
The point is that detailed models make judgm€nt
explicit (and hopefully transjarent) . The decisionmaker
can control target engagement priorities, onen fire
ranges
f
etc. Critical parameters can be modified to
reflect changes in tactics and battle doctrine.
This is not so for aggregated models. The firepower
index—keystone of the aggregated models—is predicated
on a highly stylized interpretation of combat. Its
derivation rests on judgments about tactics, open fire
ranges, rates of fire, and the distribution of that fire
(e.g., the percentage of tank firings directed at armor,
mechanized personnel carriers, and foot infantry) , etc.
In other words, both the structure (aggregation scheme)
and input data (firepower potential scores) for an
aggregated model contain critical assumptions— assump-
tions that may be methodologicly and intuitively inap-
propriate for a particular analysis.
Eecall our concern for model transparency.
These two methods of attrition modeling may be used in a
Monte Carlo simulation model, an analytical model or a mixed
model. The hazards and benefits of each of these types of
models need illumination. The simulation tends to provide a
high level of detail about combat processes and is therefore
considered more credible by many people [ Ref . 11: p. 16].
Because of the use of statistical sampling techniques, many
consider these models to be a more accurate portrayal of
combat. This level of detail carries a high price tag.
Model development for a Monte Carlo simulation may take five
32
to ten man-years of effort to fully develop [Bef. 12].
These models tend to be very expensive to run since one
needs 10-100 replications of the simulation to achieve
statistical stability. Table 3 lists some disadvantages of
a Monte Carlo simulation of comtat [Ref. 11: p. 19].
TABLE 3
















ally impossible to perform
er parametric studies.
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Analytical models, whether stochastic or deterministic,
are distinguished as being more abstract than Monte Carlo
simulations. Good analytical models are "usually quite
abstract, poor in the number of variables explicitly consid-
ered, but rich in ease of nanipula tion and clarity of
insight" [ Ref . 11: p- 10]. The primary advantage of an
analytical model is the smaller amount of time needed to run
the model on a computer. This facilitates sensitivity and
parametric analysis or. the resulting data. A secondary
advantage of the analytical mcdel is transparency. The
basic structure and assumptions of analytical models tend to
be easily understood in comparison to Monte Carlo simula-
tions. The analytical model terds to fulfill our attributes
of transparency, appraisal and consistency better than do
simulations; however, the degree of simplicity in analytical
models may be a serious detractor. A hybrid analytical-
simulation model may afford a better mix of transparency,
consistency, appraisal and sophistication. [Ref. 11]
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Other criteria which will influence our model selection
for generation of CARF values are practical restraints due
to the structure of the Marine Corps. The model should be
expected to handle a heavily reinforced Marine Corps divi-
sion, known as a Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) . Since the
Marine Corps normally fights as an integrated air-ground
team, we would expect air power, both helicopter and fixed
wing, to be modeled. The division size model seems to be a
point of transition in current combat models. A division is
not so large that it cannot be modeled with a high resolu-
tion model allowing detailed attrition modeling. If the
unit size were any larger, we would transition to a theater
level model in which the resolution is generally low and
attrition modeling becomes less transparent.
Due to the amphibious mission which is unique to the
Marine Corps, it would be an asset for any model to possess
the ability to model at least the amphibious phase of a
scenario. Although this is net necessarily crucial, the
modeling of this type of combat does pose a significantly
different attrition process than land combat. Amphibious
landing attrition estimates should be part of a CARF value
when dictated by the scenario. Terrain and weather are also
important factors to consider ic a model. These two factors
are critical in actual combat and can account for large
variations in the outcome of battle; hence, a model incorpo-
rating weather and terrain considerations would be consid-
ered a stronger, more accurate (consistent) model.
In this chapter, we have considered many attributes of a
model which we use to produce CARF values. These attributes
may be used as criteria by which we can screen current
combat models. Such criteria are subjective in nature and
are not easily measured except for a simple yes or no
answer. We now consider a measureable criterion by which we
can rate models as to their cost of operation.
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B- A MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS (MOE) FOH EXISTING COMEAT
MODELS
Existing combat models generally have been documented to
the extent that several objective measures of the models are
known. For the purposes of screening a combat model for
CARF value generation, we will take advantage of such meas-
ures common to most documented models. These measures are
generally expressed in units of time. Time to acquire a
data base, time to structure a data base, playing time per
cycle, CPU time per model cycle, learning time (for war
games) and output analysis time, are all examples of meas-
ures common among existing models [Ref. 13]. We would be
able tc measure the effectiveness of a model in terms of
time economy by summing the amount of time require! to
obtain results for one model cycle. The different units of
time used in measuring manpower and CPU utilization are a
hindrance. If we were to assign a cost per man-month and a
cost per minute of CPU time, we could aggregate the measures
(time required for data base analysis and preparation, output
analysis and evaluation, and CPU time) of each model into a
total cost per cycle of each nodel under evaluation. To
keep this comparison on an equivalent basis, we can assign a
model cycle to be a day (24 hours) of modeled combat. Our
comparison now yields the total cost (in dollars) for the
first day of combat for each ccmbat model being considered
for CARF generation. Figure 4.2 gives a graphic display of
this method of deriving a measure of combat model cost
effectiveness. The MCE illustrated in Figure 4.2 enables us
to compare the cost of the first day of combat for each
model surveyed. We consider such factors as the cost of CPU
time, the cost of manpower to acquire and prepare a data
base, and the cost of manpower for output analysis and eval-
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Figure 4.2 Measure of Effectiveness for Comparison
of Combat Models.
The last segment of our cost comparison uses an approxi-
mate daily cost of operation for each model. We know that
the costs of operating the model for each successive day of
combat will decrease since less time is generally required
for data base acquisition and preparation. In general, a
closed-loop (systemic) model requires input of the decision
logic before the first day of model operation; hence, the
cost of decision logic input is paid before the model's
first day of operation. The man-in-the-loop model bears the
cost of decision logic input during operation of the model
since the players are responsible for input of decision
logic. We can compare the daily operational cost of each
model, minus the cost of data base acquisition, preparation
and analysis. Adding the dailj CPU, player, and operator
costs (as applicable) for each model gives us a daily opera-
tional cost. We will interpret the daily operational cost
as the cost to operate the model for 24-hours of simulated
combat within one day. This will require man-in-the-loop
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(real-time) models to operate en a 24-hour basis (shifts of
players may be needed). Comparison of the daily operational
cost will Le an approximate measure of how rapidly model
operation costs accumulate- Since the CARF is defined to
measure attrition over thirty days, we will compare the
rates of operational cost accumulation over a 30-day period
of simulated combat for each model.
Remembering the critique of the current CARF generation
system from Chapter II and the criteria described in Chapter
III, we will be able to proceed to Chapter V for a compar-
ison cf different combat models for generating CARF esti-
mates. Note that we are not comparing model effectiveness
(or quality) ; rather, we are comparing models in order to
ascertain their suitability for the purpose of generating
CARF values. Careful use of the criteria described sc far
will yield one or more combat models which exhibit accep-
table performance with regard tc the derived criteria.
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V. COMPARISON OF SELECTED COMBAT MODELS
This chapter will compare several currently used combat
models using the criteria discussed in previous chapters. A
brief review of the evaluating criteria is appropriate at
this point. Chapter III mentioned two important criteria.
First, the cause of attrition to be considered in a combat
model is outlined in Table 2 . Most models will not be
capable of accommodating all causes of attrition, but Table
2 is a guideline for the type cf attrition to be reflected
by a CAEF. Secondly, we mentioned three practical
restraints which are indigenous to the Marine Corps. These
are:
(1) to minimize additional manpower required for model
operation,
(2) to use data from existing Marine Corps sources, and
(3) to be compatible with existing Marine Corps
computer (hardware) resources.
In Chapter IV, we were able to derive six model attri-
butes to be used as evaluation criteria. (1) Model assump-
tions and deductive processes should be clearly documented
and understood in order to give a transparent guality to the
model. (2) The model should he appraised for mathematical
correctness and a realistic match of science and the real
world. (3) The model should be consistent in appraising the
scenario being modeled. (4) The process used to model
attrition within the model shculd be detailed in nature.
Aggregated attrition process tends toward inconsistency and
opacity. (5) The modeling capatilities preferred for a CARF
generation system are to model:
(a) a Marine Corps Amphibious Force (MAF)
,
(b) aviation forces (fixed wing and helicopter)
,
(c) terrain and weather factors, and
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(d) the amphibious assault phase of a combat scenario.
(6) Figure 4.2 illustrated a method of comparing the oper-
ating costs of the first day of combat of the combat models
being evaluated. Comparison of daily operational costs were
also discussed.
Five combat models will be evaluated for their suit-
ability to generate CARF values. The combat models to be
evaluated are:
(1) Vector-2,
(2) The Amphibious Warfare Model (AWM)
,
(3) Combat Sample Generator (COSAGE) ,
(4) Division Map Exercise (DIME) , and
(5) Corps/Division Evaluation Model (CORDIVEM}
.
These models were chosen tecause each is capable of
modeling combat for a MAF. Points of contact for obtaining
further information pertaining to these models are available
in Appendix C. The evaluation of the five models will
proceed in order of the evaluating criteria reviewed above.
A. THE CAUSES OF ATTRITION CONSIDERED BI THE MODEL
Table 4 illustrates the type of attrition, by cause and
category, considered in each model. Most of the five models
portray the same types of attrition, except the Amphibious
Warfare Model (AWM) . As part of its amphibious assault
module, it has a limited ability to model loss of material
in transit during the amphibious phase of the operation due
to cruise missile, artillery and sea mines [ Ref . 14; p. 19].
The A WM ' s capacity to consider loss of materials in transit
is unique among the five models. Four of the five models
have limited capability to model attrition of equipment in
storage and maintenance. The ability to model this type of
attrition depends upon the depth of the sectors designated
for the major units (division) in the model. The depth
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typically varies from twenty to eighty kilometers from the
FEBA depending on the capability of the model and the scen-
ario. Attrition at greater depths must he accomplished by
other means. COSAGE does possess the capacity to model
weapons system wear out. A typical example is wear of the
tube on an artillery piece. If the tube wears out, the
artillery piece is removed from combat until maintenance is
completed [fief. 3: p. 47]. Reallocation of equipment to
other services or allies is accomplished through the logis-
tics and supply inputs in each cf the models.
B. SOME PRACTICAL CCHSIDERATIO NS
Manpower requirements fcr Vector-2 ace variable
depending on the frequency and intensity of use. Once the
several decision modules contained in the model have been
adapted to Marine Corps doctrine, the data input and opera-
tion of the model would proceed rapidly [ Ref . 15]- For
Marine Corps use, we can estimate 2 to 3 people are needed
to operate the model once the decision logic is in place.
Although six man-months are required for initial data base
acquisition and formation, this time is greatly reduced in
subsequent usage since the input data changes very little
[fief. 15]- Vector-2 could be managed by analysts currently
available in the Marine Corps. Data for Marine Corps usage
of Vector-2 could be obtained from data bases at CNA or the
JCS, a user of Vector-2. Since Vector-2 is written in ANSI
FORTRAN, the computers available for Marine Corps' use
should be adequate. The model needs a minimum of 120K
storage to function [fief. 13]- Extensive use of a large
data base would preclude use of a mini-computer and dictate
utilization of the AMDAHL mainframe computer at Quantico.
The Amphibious Warfare Model (AWM) is an adoption of
Vector- 1 (Vector- 1 is the predecessor of Vector-2). AWM is
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written in FORTRAN and is smaller in size and scope than
Vector-2. The model is currently being used at CNA for
Marine Corps related studies [Eef. 16]. Additional manpower
requirements to the Marine Corps to operate AWM would be
small. CNA currently employs only one full-time staff
member to operate the AWM. For use in CARF generation, it
is estimated that 1 or 2 people would be be required for
operation. CNA maintains current data for model usage and
uses its own computer (a VAX unit) for execution of the
model. The AWM is compatible with Marine Corps computer
assets.
The COSAGE model is used at the Concepts Analysis Agency
(CAA) as part of the WARRAMPS methodology. It is written in
SIMCRIPT II. 5 programming language and is currently executed
on a ONIVAC 1100/82. CAA maintains a staff of 10-14
personnel to maintain and execute the model and its exten-
sive data base. Marine Corps use would necessitate a staff
of approximately the same size. Data requirements for the
model are extensive, up to 30 man-months are required to
acquire and format the necessary inputs. The Marine Corps
has no source of data for COSAGE other than data available
from CAA. Basically a Monte Carlo simulation, C05AGE
requires large amounts of computer time to complete a
24-hour day of combat (up to 18C minutes). [Refs. 17-19]
The Division Map Exercise (DIME) is a two-sided,
computer assisted, open map exercise. It is written in HP
Basic and operates en a Hewlett Packard (HP) 9816 mini-
computer with a hard disk storage device and a printer
[Ref. 20]. About six people (4 players and 2 controllers)
are needed to operate the model. The data base initially
requires about three man-months to acquire [fief. 21]- Since
DIME is a man-in-the-loop war game, the time to complete a
cycle is significantly longer than a closed-loop model. Over
24 hours of "play" are needed tc simulate a (24-hour) day of
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combat. Data for the model could be acquired, at least
partially, from the existing data base for the AWM at CNA.
The Corps/Division Evaluation Model (CORDIVSM) is
written in FORTRAN with some program modules in SIMSCRIPT.
It is a two-sided deterministic model which requires about
twenty people for operation (14 gamers, 3 staff, 3-4
controllers) [Ref. 22]. The model uses two VAX- 11/780
computers and six additional disk drives. Large amounts of
memory are dedicated to its detailed attrition processes.
Approximately three and a half man-months are needed to
acquire and format the necessary data. [Ref. 13]
Since the Marine Corps has no SIMSCRIPT compiler at the
present time [Ref. 23 ], implementation of COSAGE and
CORDIVEM would require acquisition of the SIMSCRIPT compiler
and the necessary hardware. These two models also carry a
sizable manpower requirement. Vector-2 and the AWM are both
closed-loop models which are written in FORTRAN, a language
which can be accommodated by the AMDAHL main frame computer
at Quantico. DIME is also a possible choice for implementa-
tion, but acquisition of an HP9316 or change of programming
language is required.
C. MODEL TEANSPARENCY
Ihe basic assumptions and deductive processes within
Vector-2 have been well documented. The differential equa-
tions used by Vector-2 are familiar to most analysts. This
indicates that Vector-2 is reasonably transparent for an
experienced user. Since this mcdel is used by several agen-
cies (CAA, IDA, TRASANA, SAGA) , alternate sources of infor-
mation about the modeling assumptions and deductive
processes are available [Ref. 13].
The AWM is also a well documented model. Its key
assumptions and deductive processes are well described
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[Refs. 14,24]. Based on Vector-1, AWM is not as extensive
as Vector-2 in scope, but it is transparent. Unfortunately,
the AWM is used primarily for weapons systems comparisons
and not for prolonged combat modeling efforts; accordingly,
the model is not fully exercised by the CNA staff [Ref. 16].
The Monte Carlo simulation processes and assumptions in
COSAGE are not as well documented as Vector-2 and AWM.
Output from COSAGE is intended for use as an input to CEM.
This restricts usage of COSAGE as an independent model since
its major assumptions are geared to this role. As a "stand
alone" model, COSAGE is not especially transparent.
DIME is a relatively new model which has not seen exten-
sive use. Its assumptions and deductive processes are
clearly outlined [Ref. 25]. Beinj a man-in-the-loop model,
the deductive processes should be enhanced. The model will
probably prove to be transparent once its use increases.
Originally scheduled for application in 1982, CORDIVEM
bears indications of diminished transparency. Although
model assumptions are clearly stated, the deductive
processes within the model are not thoroughly clear. As a
result, player learning time and apprenticeship for this
model tends to be quite long (up to six months) [Ref- 26].
Additionally, deductive processes are not clearly imple-
mented in the interaction between modules within the struc-
ture of the model [Ref. 27], This would indicate the model
suffers from lack of transparency in comparison to the ether
models considered.
D. MATHEMATICAL APPRAISAL
Vector-2 is a differential combat model and has been
appraised as being mathematically sound [fief. 15]. The
algorithms of Vector-2 generally resemble a reasonable
representation of real world attrition [Ref. 10: p. 71].
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The AWM, being primarily a Vectcr-1 model, is also appraised
as mathematically correct by the CNA staff. Its algorithms
seem to be a reasonable representation of real world attri-
tion processes.
COSAGE, a high resolution Monte Carlo simulation of
combat, has been appraised as being mathematically sound and
representative of real world attrition [fief. 18]. However,
for Marine Corps use, there is the current problem of non-
representative helicopter and tactical air modules
[Eef. 19]- These are now modeled off-line due to unreal-
istic output from the model.
Due to its recent development, DIME has not undergone
much appraisal of its algorithms. Its basic approach for
attrition is use of Single Shot Kill Probability (SSKP)
[fief. 20 ], and DIME appears to realistically model real
world attrition processes.
COfiDIVEM has been appraised as using mathematically
correct models within its man} modules [fief. 22]. Doubt
exists as to the realism of the output of the model, with
lack of coordination between modules within the model cited
as the cause [Ref. 27].
E. HODEI CONSISTENCY
Vector-2 is analytical in nature. It produces consis-
tent predictable results based en the inputs applied by the
operator. Sensitivity analysis is easily performed due to
the analytical nature of the irodel; therefore, allowing
discussion of various viewpoints based on the assumptions.
The AWM and DIME are considered to be consistent in the
results produced by the model [ Befs. 16,21].
COSAGE and CORDIVEM both exhibit signs of inconsistency.
CORDIVEM suffers frcm lack of connectivity between modules
(discussed in the prior section). COSAGE suffers from
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inconsistency in the helicopter and tactical air modules.
All five models discussed are capable of reproducing the
results of a particular run when needed.
F. THE ATTEITIOH PROCESS
The attrition processes in Vector-2 are detailed. This
detailed attrition is characteristic of the differential
equation algorithms used in the model. The basic differen-
tial equations of the combat model are generally of the form
dn- /dt = - i. Ay, n; for all groups i, (5.1)
J
where t is time, n\ is the current numerical strength in
weapons of the ith group of weapons, and Ay, is the current
numerical value of the attritior coefficient for a weapon in
the jth group against weapons in the ith group. Vector-2
generally solves this equation iteratively until the
following end-of-battle condition is reached:
An-, = - £ Ay, nj At (5.2)
where An-, is the change in strength of weapon group i during
a time increment At. Using the differential equation 5.1,
Vector-2 attrites weapon i as a result of the fire from
weapon j. Attrition continues until either a predetermined
decrease (An) in the number cf weapon i is reached or a
specified amount of time (At) has passed. The attrition
coefficient, Ay, , is calculated for two different types of
target acquisition: serial and parallel. Serial target
acquisition is modeled as a Markov renewal process. The
parallel target acquisition process is based on a target
priority scheme without the detection threshold schemes used
in conjunction with serial acquisition. The documentation
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of the attrition processes in Vector-2 is thorough and
includes derivation of all equations used in the model
[Ref. 28: p. 51-55]- The AWil uses similar attrition
processes since it is based on Vector-1. The attrition
processes which were added to Vector-1 to give the model its
amphibious assault phase are either Lanchester based
[Ref. 14: p. 46] or expected- valued computations [Ref- 14:
p. 62]. Examples of these types of attrition equations from
the AWM are given in Figure 5.1 All attrition processes in
the AWM are detailed in nature and well documented.
COSAGE is extremely detailed in the attrition process.
In close combat, attrition is detailed to the level of the
individual weapons system or item of equipment using the
SSPK [Ref. 19]. All attrition processes in COSAGE are
accomplished by Monte Carlo simulation.
The equipment attrition methodology in DIKE is primarily
detailed in nature and is hased on Single Shot Kill
Probability (SSKP)
.













k (5 - 3)
where Kl is the number of kills of target type k, li is the
number of targets of type k, SSKPj^ is the Single Shot Kill
Probability of firer i at target type k and R-^ is the
number of rounds fired by firer i at a target of type k
[Ref. 20].
CORDIVErl also relies on Lanchester methodology to model
weapon system and eguipment attrition. It is extremely
detailed and allows the user to track losses as small as
individual items loaded on a particular vehicle [Ref. 22].
The price of this extreme detail is the requirement of a
large amount of computer storage, as we have sean earlier in
this chapter.
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1. Artillery Duel Model: The Lanchester Equations are:
dm/dt = - (B) c(t) for blue, and
dn/dt = -(A)n(t) for red
where m (t) is the number of blue artillery pieces, n (t)
is the number of red artillery pieces, A and 3 are the
rates at which artillery pieces are lost to either
suppressions or kills. The solution to the equation is:
m (t) = m <COSH-jABt ) - n H3/A (SINH-j(AB) t) , and
n (t) = n (COSHfABt ) - m -fA/B (SINHf(AB) t)
where n«, and m are the initial number of artillery
pieces for red and blue, respectively.
Attrition Due to Sea Mines: The number of landing
craft and assault vehicles lost to sea mines is
determined by the equation:
where N
rr\
E(Losses) = Nw (1-MCm ) (1-EXP (-GW/C) )
is the number of mines in tne area.
Ml'' is the fraction of mines cleared by minem counter measures.
G is the number of transits through the
minefield
,
W is the aggregate mine damage width, and
C is the width of the oinefield.
Figure 5. 1 Example of Attrition Equations used
in the Amphibious Assault Phase of the AWM-.
G. 30DE1 CAPABILITIES
Vector-2 has the capability of handling theater level
scenarios at the cost of aggregation to the battalion level
[Ref. 13]. Vector-2 could easily handle a MAF and an appro-
priately sized opposing force. When modeling conflicts
smaller than theater level (such as a MAF) , Vector-2 has the
advantage of aggregation to the company level to allow a
more detailed study by the user [Ref. 29: p. 1]. Terrain
and its effects are modeled by six levels of intervisibi lty
and six levels of trafficability . Weather conditions are
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modeled within each sector and may he updated as frequently
as every hour. Vector-2 does have a limited capacity for
representing items to he modeled. The number of items to be
represented are limited to 27 weapons types, 1 personnel
type, 17 equipment types and 34 supply types for each
opposing side [Eef- 29: p. 32]. This imposes a limit on the
number of items for which CAEF values may be generated
directly.
The AWM is designed to model a MAF in combat. Terrain
is modeled in a manner similar to Vector-2, but with only
five levels of intervisibilty and trafficabilit y. Weather
is not considered [Ref. 30]. Amphibious warfare is modeled
explicitly, since this is the primary purpose of the model.
It should be noted that supply consumption is not modeled in
the current version of the model [Ref. 14: p. 12].
COSAGE is designed to model an Army division in conflict
with an appropriate opposing force. Terrain is modeled
specifically in three groups: the Fulda group, the north
German plain group, and the mixed terrain group [Ref. 17: p.
III-127]. Feather (or visibility) is categorized into three
separate effects in the model. Combinations of the effects
are used to characterize smoke ,dust, haze, fog, mist, rain, snow
and illumination [Ref. 17: p. 111-15]. COSAGE has no
specific ability to model amphibious assault.
DIMS is designed to model an Army division in conflict
with an opposing army. Up to 21 different systems may be
modeled on each side. Terrain and weather are both consid-
ered as battlefield modifiers. DIME has no specific ability
to model amphibious assault.
COEDIVEM is designed to model an Army division or corps
in conflict against an appropriate opposing force. Terrain
and weather are specifically modeled while amphibious
assault is not.
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COSAGE, DIME, and CORDIVEM all consider effects of
tactical fixed wing aircraft and helicopters; although,
COSAGE must currently calculate these effects off-line due
to problems with the tactical air module.
H. COST COHPABISOH
Figure 5.2 compares the time requirements for various
phases of the combat models being evaluated. The individual
model cycle length 1 was included to illustrate that the
man-in-the-loop model will generally use more actual time
per hour of simulated combat than a closed-loop model. We
also note the time requirements for CPU time and data base
functions are larger for the Monte Carlo simulation (COSAGE)
than the analytical simulations of combat (Vector-2, AWM) .
Using Figure 4.2 as a basis, Figure 5.3 is a comparison
of the cost of operation of each model. The costs are based
on CPU time at $10.0 per minute 2 and manpower requirements
at $3,333.33 per man-month. 3 This comparison illustrates the
expenditure to model the first 24-hour day of combat. For
all models, except COSAGE, the cost of each successive day
will be less because the data tase acquisition and format-
ting costs will greatly decrease. Since COSAGE is set up to
input its data into (the theater level model) CEM, it is not
easily used for modeling a second day of combat [Ref. 18].
The data output from the first day of combat must be evalu-
ated and reformatted before initiating a second day of
combat. A key assumption in COSAGE is "...modeling 24- hours
of combat produces combat sample results...." [ Eef . 17: p.
II-3], and these results are used as inputs to CEM. The
1 The individual model cycle length is the number of
hours of actual combat simulated per cycle of model use.
2 Cost data for CPU time was adapted from NPS daytime
cost rate.
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cost comparison in Figure 5.3 also disregards the cost of
players in a war game. The closed-loop models avoid this
cost and, when viewed from this perspective, are more
economical. A model such as COEDIVEM requires six months of
player training and apprenticeship 4 for fourteen players
[Hef. 26]. The cost of fourteen players, even for one day,
is large. Training of one group of players would cost ahout
$13,333.32 for DIME [H players) and $46,666.62 for CORDIVEM
(14 players). Unless the model has an additional mission of
tactical training, the expense may not be justified. When
we add the cost of training one group (or shift) of players
to the last column of Figure 5.3, we have the total cost for
the first day (24-hours) of modeled combat including player
training cost for one group of players. The second column
of Table 5 illustrates this cost by model.
If we compare the daily operational costs in the manner
discussed in Chapter IV, we will be able to graphically
compare the daily operational cost of each model for a
30-day period. For our example, we can use the cost of the
first day of combat as the y-irtercept and the daily opera-
tional cost as the slope for each of the models. We need to
consider the salaries of each person needed to continuously
operate each model and the CPU time required for a 24-hour
day of simulated combat to arrive at a daily operational
cost for each model. This is illustrated in Table 6 . We
note in Table 6 that a closed-loop model, like Vector-2,
takes very little time to complete a day of simulated
combat. We have implicitly assumed in our comparison that
running a day of combat in a closed-loop model requires one
working day. Therefore, we have over-estimated the cost of
daily operation to seme extent since a closei-loop model
CORDIVEM requires about 4 weeks of training followed by




Cost Comparison of Combat Models Including Player
Training Cost
Model




With One Group cf
Trained Players








Vector-2 $ 21,668.48 $ 21,668.48







DIME $ 25,566.65 3 65,566.61
CORDIVEM S 65,266.61 $ 158,599.85
takes much less than a working day (8-hours) to complete a
day of simulated combat. The resulting inaccuracy will not
detract from our model comparison since the closed-loop
models will tend to have much lower operational costs than
the man-in-the-loop models. Man-in-the-loop models (DIME,
CORDIVEM) must be operated on a 24-hour a day basis to
achieve a simulated ccmbat day within 24-hours. An adjust-
ment factor for the number of shifts needed in a day is
applied in Table 6 to adjust for this problem. The adjust-
ment factor is the number of shifts of players needed to
operate a man-in-the-loop model continuously (24 hours a
day). We also need to compensate for the number of shifts
which must be trained to operate a man-in-the-loop model
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CORDIVEM). Since this is a training cost incurred before
the first day of model operation, we will add this cost to
the the last column of Figure 5.3 to find the cost of the
first day of modeled combat adjusted for shifts of trained
players. The last column of lable 5 displays the cost of
the first day of modeled combat adjusted for the cost of the
required number of shifts of trained players. Using the
data from the last column of Table 5 (as y-intercept) and
Table 6 (as slope), we can graphically compare the cost to
operate the models fcr 30 days of simulated combat for a
given scenario. Although these are approximate costs,
Figure 5.4 is helpful for comparison of the models. Figure
5.4 shows that COSAGE, CORDIVEM and DIME have greater daily
operational costs (from the slope) than Vector- 2 and AWH.
Since this is a high cost estimate for these two models, we
can say the closed-loop model (such as AWM or Vector-2) is
more economical than a man- in- t he-loop model for the purpose
of CARE generation.
We have compared five combat models on the basis of
criteria derived in earlier chapters. Each of the models
exhibit strengths and weaknesses when reviewed for the
purposes of CAEF generation. In the final chapter, we will
draw conclusions as to which models are best suited for CARF
generation and make recommendations for further action.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
We have surveyed five combat models for the purpose of
generating CARF values. In this chapter, we will make
observations and conclusions as to which models are best
suited for this purpose. We will follow the conclusions
with recommendations for further study.
A. CCHCIOSIOHS
For the purpose of CARF generation, man-in-the-loop
models (such as DIME and CORDIVEM) exhibit two distinct
disadvantages. First, these models generally take longer to
complete a full (24-hcur) day of combat than a closed-loop
model (such as COSAGE, AWM or Vector-2) . For instance, we
would need to operate the DIMI continuously for at least
thirty calender days to obtair thirty days of simulated
combat data for use in generating a CARF for one version of
a particular scenario. The closed-loop model (such as
Vector-2) would complete several versions of a particular
scenario within thirty days. This is a great advantage when
accurate CARF estimates are needed on short notice or
several possible variations within a particular scenario
must be analyzed. Secondly, the man-in-the-loop model
requires trained players; the closed-loop model does not.
As discussed in the previous chapter, this creates addi-
tional expense in operating the model. Each player must
complete a training period (both DIME and CORDIVEM require
at least one month per player) before he is useful in the
modeling process.
Training time and playing time are an expensive
commodity which can be avoided by the use of closed-loop
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models. Unless the CARF generation process is combined with
some type of tactical training or schooling, there is no
need for the added expense and time created by using a man-
in-the-loop model. Table 7 illustrates the time required to
complete thirty days of simulated combat and the number of
operators and players needed for each combat model.
TABLE 7
Comparison of Time and Personnel Requirements for the
Combat Models






Vector-2 5.5 minutes approx. 3
AWM 150' minutes 1 to 2
COSAGE 10 to 90 days 10 to 14
DIME 30 days (see ncte) 6
CCRDIVEM 30 days (see note) 20
Note: DIME and CCRDIVEM would require 30 days only
if the model were operated on a 24-hour a




The speed with which a closed-loop model operates
enables the user to evaluate alternate versions of a
specific scenario. This is particularly true of analytical
models (such as AWM and Vector-2) whicn are faster than a
Monte Carlo simulation (e.g. COSAGE). COSAGE would also be
difficult to adapt for CARF gereration since it is designed
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to produce only one day of combat as input to CEM (noted in
Chapter V)
.
Vector-2 and the AtfM have the added benefit
that no additional computer hardware or software is needed
for Marine Corps use. This is cot true of COSAGE, DIME, and
CORDIVEM.
Evaluation of the AWM and Vector-2 in Chapter V revealed
that these two models are particularly well suited to CARF
generation. Both are closed- lcop models and analytical in
nature. AWM and Vector-2 are not staff intensive and
neither hears the current consistency problems common to
COSAGE and CORDIVEM- Vector-2 is probably a better choice
for a CARF generation system since it models weather and is
generally considered more sophisticated than the AWM. AWM
does not specifically model the effect of weather (a
restriction inherited from Vectcr-1).
As with any model adapted to generation of CARF values,
Vector-2 must be scrutinized to modify its internal decision
modules to reflect Marine Corps doctrine. Once this is
accomplished, the data base may be taken, in part, from the
AtfH since much of the data required for both models is
similar. Vector-2 also has potential for using the amphib-
ious phase of the AWM, if amphibious assault must be modeled
within a scenario.
B. RECCHHE3DATI0BS
As a result of the study of CARF generation, we can make
four recommendations. First, the current system of gener-
ating CARF values through conversion of Army WARF values
could be improved by using a basic combat model such as
Vector-2. Secondly, procedures for selecting items for
which CARF values are to be generated should be reviewed.
An item may be assigned a CARF value as a result of its
physical relationship to another item (i.e. the CARF for
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tank tracks will depend on the CARF for tanks) . Thirdly,
since the CARF is used primarily in the budgeting process,
particularly expensive items should be monitored closely
during CARF generation. Budgeting for such items defends
upon the accuracy of the CARP values generated. These
items, as well as items which involve scarce resources or
long manufacturing lead times, should be designated as
"critical items" to be specifically monitored within a CARF
generation process. Lastly, additional means of estimating
equipment losses must be used to supply attrition estimates
for those causes of attrition not considered by Vector-2.
These causes of attrition are evident from comparison of
Table 2 and Table 4 . These estimates may be the result of
historical data, exercise data, military judgment, or other
modeling efforts.
It is hoped that this survey of combat models for use in
CARF generation will he helpful to those who conduct further
work in this problem area.
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APPENDIX A
A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT CABF DETERMINATION SYSTEM
Figure A.1 is a schematic cf the four major modules of
the current CARF Determination System. Explanation of the
system will proceed in order of the four major modules as
marked in the figure.
A. THE WARF EXTRACTION MODULE
The WARF extraction module extracts from the Army's WARF
data tape the necessary Line Item Numbers (LIN) for the
entire process. The process cf deriving the WARF will be
explained later in Appendix B.
B. THE CARF REFERENCE DATA FILE (CRDF) UPDATE MODULE
The CRDF update completes a Table of Authorized Material
Control Number (TAMCN) and LIN cross reference as well as
recording the assigned equipment category codes. Three
programs are used to maintain the CRDF.
1 • The CRDF L IN Validation Program
The LIN validation program matches a new WARF
Extract File against the CRDF and reports the two following
conditions: first, any new LIN on the WARF tape and
secondly, any LIN deleted from the WARF tape.
2 - The CRDF TAMCN Validation Program
The TAMCN Validation Program matches the Item Data
File (IDF) against the CRDF tc report the three fcliowing
conditions: any new TAMCN, any deleted TAMCN and any CRDF
records without valid equipment category codes.
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3 - The CRDF Update Program
The CRDF Update Program enables the user to manually
delete CRD? records, add records or change individual fields
within records.
C. TBS CAAR/CARF DETERMINATION PROGRAM
The CAAR/CARF Determination Program processes user
generated CAAR/CARF adjustments against previously created
preliminary CAARs. Final CAARs are recorded on the CAAR
history file and CARF transactions are placed in a data-set
to be used to update the IDF.
D. THE CAAR HISTORY UPDATE MODULE
The CAAR History Update Module provides for the collec-
tion of equipment attrition data not only from the CAAR/CARF
determination process, but from studies, exercises, simula-
tions, peacetime usage, combat history and other such
events. This program does provide a data collection capa-
bility not enjoyed until the adoption of this system. Any







































AN OVERVIEW OF THE GENERATION OF A WARTIME ACTIVE
REPIACEMENT FACTOR (WARF)
Since we have already seen how the CARF is generated, we
must determine how the basis of the CARF determination
system is produced. The WARF (the adopted parent of CARF)
,
is one of three outputs of the U.S. Army Wartime
Requirements for Ammunition, Material and Personnel System
(WAREAMPS) . The WARF is defined as the average daily cata-
strophic (non- reparable) item loss rate expressed as a
percent of the average authorized item strength in the
combat theater. The WARF differs from the CARF in that it
is expressed as the average daily loss rate vice a 30-day
rate. Unlike the CARF, which is expressed for the 30-day
period, the WARF is computed for several periods of
different lengths all adding to 130 days. The time incre-
ments are two 15-day periods followed by five 30-day
periods.
The mission of WARRAMPS is to simulate future conflicts
using a specified weapons system and force-mix in an Army
specified theater of operations against a predetermined
threat. The output of WARRAME is inclusive of the entire
theater over the duration of combat operations and specifies
the ammunition expended (by DODIC) , the material destroyed
(by LIN) , and the personnel killed or wounded (by MOS) .
We are interested in the cutput of material destroyed
which leads to the determinati en of WARFs. The WARRAMPS
consists of a hierarchy of models comprising the following
four major parts:
1. Preprocessers,
2. Combat Sample Generator Model (COSAGE)
,
3. The Concepts Evaluation Model (CEM) , and
U. Postprocessers.
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The system also allows for the input of Army doctrine
regarding battlefield deploymert of the friendly and enemy
forces aion^ with enemy tactical doctrine.
A. THE PBEPBOCESSEB
The preprocesser component consists of the preliminary
inputs required to operate the COSAGE model. These inputs
require considerable resources to prepare. About ten man-
months are required fcr the technical data base while thirty
man-months are required for the force definition data and
analysis.
B. THE COMBAT SAMPLE GENEBATOE (COSAGE) MODEL
COSAGE is a high resolution model which creates a "styl-
ized day" of combat for the theater given the data set.
Stylized day simply means that the model runs a 24-hour
period of simulated combat and produces a "typical combat
day". One should remember that while COSAGE is a high reso-
lution division size model (with corresponding red force)
which resolves as low as the platoon level (with corre-
sponding red force) / it does so for only one 24-hour period.
C. THE CONCEPTS EVALUATION MODEL (CEM)
The 24-hour "stylized day" of combat output (produced by
COSAGE) is utilized in the next stage by the Concepts
Evaluation Model (CEM). The CEM is a low resolution, fully
automated war-gaming model that expands the output of COSAGE





— resolves to; battalions, several hundred sectors,
—time phased using 12-hour steps,
—
-controlled by simulatedy commander's decision, and
-sensitive to design-impcrtant force characteristics.
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The output from CEM is quite detailed and includes:
--EEBA location and movement,
--unit mission , location, boundaries and status,
—on-hand personnel, major weapons supplies,
— artillery ammunition consumption,
—battalion engagement frequencies,
— force ratio engagement type, and
—fighter-aircraft availarility, allocation and
losses.
D. THE POSTPEOCESSEES
The fourth major component cf the WABEAMP system are the
postprocessers which transforms output of COSAGE, CEM and
historical data into WARFs. Ihe principal model used in
this process is Equipment Loss Consolidater (ELCON). It
should he noted that ELCON is essentially a bookkeeping
routine, while COSAGE and CEM perform the actual attrition
processes. Direct fire weapons and activities are attrited
primarily by CEM, while losses cf items not normally engaged
in direct fire activities such as motor vehicles, engineer
equipment and radar are computed through Army historical
data and COSAGE output. Losses for extraneous reasons (such
as wear out, pilferage, guerilla activity) are obtained
primarily from Army historical data. Figure B. 1 presents an
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Center for Naval Analysis
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US Army Combined Arms Operations Research
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(5) CORDIVEM: Mr. T. Bailey
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Activity (ATZL-CAR-MD)
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